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COMMENTS ON RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS.
Improper Remarks by the Judge to the Jury.-In the case of Green v.
State, decided by the Supreme Court of MHississippi at the present term, the
essential facts were these: While the jury was being made up the judge went
into the sheriff's office and instructed a deputy to summon young men for talesmen, saying, "We want to break this nigger's neck." Of the five talesmen summoned all except one were young men, and the jury as thus constituted found
the accused guilty and the judge sentenced him to be hanged. On appeal, the
Supreme Court granted the defendant a new trial on the ground that the
remarks of the judge were calculated to influence improperly the jury.
"It is a matter of common knowledge," said the court, "that jurors, as well as
officers in attendance upon court, are very susceptible to the influence of the
judge. The sheriff and his deputies, as a rule, are anxious to -do his bidding;
the jurors watch closely his conduct, and give attention to his language, that
they may, if possible, ascertain his leaning to one side or the other, which, if
known, often largely influences their verdict. He cannot be too careful and
guarded in language and conduct in the presence of.the jury to avoid prejudice
to either party.
"The court will not stop to inquire whether the jury was actually influenced
by the conduct of the judge. All the authorities hold that if they were exposed
to improper influences which might have produced the verdict, the presumption
of law is against its purity; and testimony will not be heard to rebut this presumption; it is a conclusive presumption."
J.W. G.
Opinions of Jurors Based on Newspaper Report Not a Ground for
Challenge.-In the last issue of the JOURNAL we commented on the practice of
challenging jurors for opinions founded merely on newspaper reports and pointed
out that its effect was to disqualify many men of intelligence who read the newspapers and thereby render difficult the selection of juries in cases which have
attracted widespread attention in the community. We are therefore glad that
the United States Supreme Court, in the case of James H. Holt, decided October 31, has ruled that the refusal of a trial court to sustain a challenge on such
a ground is not necessarily a reversible error. The juror who was challenged
in this case had taken the newspaper statements for facts, but stated that he
had no other opinion than that derived from this source. He also stated that
if the evidence presented in court should fail to prove the facts alleged in the
newspapers he would return a verdict according to the evidence or lack of evidence at the trial and that he thought he could try the case solely upon the
evidence, fairly and impartially. The Supreme Court held that the mere holding of an opinion based on newspaper report was not conclusive evidence of
partiality and did not therefore constitute a valid ground for disqualification.
This ruling strikes us as being thoroughly in accord with reason, and if followed
in the practice of state courts more generally would remove one of the most
common sources of delay in empaneling jurors.
In the same case the Supreme Court disposed of a number of other "meticulous objections" with the same disregard of the precedents. It held that an

DOCTRINE OF HARMLESS ERROR.
indictment which alleges that the assault complained of was made feloniously
and with malice aforethought is not defective because of failure to make the
same allegation in the preliminary averment of assault; that the action of the
trial court in permitting the jurors to separate during the trial was not a reversible error; that the conduct of the trial judge in requiring the accused to put on
a certain blouse was not requiring him to testify against himself; and that the
refusal of the judge' to give an instruction requested as to reasonable doubt,
though he had impressed upon the jury the nature of the belief they must entertain in order to convict, was not an error which prejudiced the cause of the
defendant. And thus justice was administered by the highest court in the land
without regard to technicality or harmless error.
J. W. G.
Doctrine of Harmless Error Repudiated in Oklahoma.-The Oklahoma
Criminal Court of Appeals, which announces that it has no respect for precedents found in the "rubbish of Noah's Ark" and that it purposes to do all in its
power to place the criminal jurisprudence of their new commonwealth on the
broad and sure foundation of reason and justice rather than upon a technical
basis, expresses the following opinion of the doctrine of harmless error (Byers
v. Territory, io3 Pac. Rep., 534):
"All lawyers will agree that there is such a thing as error without injury.
But few, if any, of them will admit that the doctrine of harmless error should
be applied to any of their cases. It required the passage of over six years before
a member of this court could realize that this doctrine had been properly applied
to one of his cases. The more we reflect upon the doctrine of harmless error
the more clearly we will see that it is in strict harmony with the philosophy of
the law, and that its recognition and enforcement by the Appellate Court is
absolutely necessary for the administration of justice. * * *
"Justice demands that in the administration of law its processes should
never be allowed to become a game of skill between contending counsel. There
has been entirely too much of this in the past. It has resulted in the miscarriage
of justice in many cases, and has bred a spirit of disgust for law and contempt
for courts in the public mind. Reduced to its last analysis, the doctrine contended for by counsel, if recognized, would require this court to hold that, where
evidence is admitted during a trial, and upon appeal it is held that such evidence was improperly admitted, a reversal of the conviction must follow,
regardless of the character of the evidence in the record, upon the ground that
the prosecution having offered this evidence as a part of its case, it is estopped
from denying its injurious effect.
"It appears to us that this application of the doctrine of estoppel to the
state in the enforcement of its criminal law, on account of the ignorance or mistaken judgment of one of its servants, is technicality run mad and gone to seed.
We decline to be bound by or to follow a line of authorities so repugnant to
reason, so demoralizing to respect for law and so destructive to justice. The
habit of reversing cases upon technicalities is a very convenient one for appellate courts, for by so doing they can escape much hard labor, and all responsibility for their decisions, for a violation of some technical rule can be found in
almost every closely contested case.
"We believe that appellate courts should faithfully and fearlessly do their
duty, and decide every question presented with reference to the substantial
merits of the case in which it arises. In this way only can justice be adminis-
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tered. Ignoring justice and deciding cases upon technicalities has not only
largely lost to the courts the confidence and respect of the people, but it has also
greatly alarmed the profession of law itself.
"No one can say that the members of the American Bar Association are
sensationalists or are wanting in learning or ability. It is eminently a conservative body. Yet we find them crying out against and proposing a remedy for this
evil. At its last meeting at Seattle, Wash., it recommended to Congress the
following amendment to the Revised Statutes of the United States: 'No judgment shall be set aside or new trial granted by any court of the United States
in any case, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of the jury or the
improper admission or rejection of evidence, or for error as to any matter of
pleading or procedure, unless in the opinion of the court to which application
is made, after an examination of the entire case, it shall affirmatively appear
that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.'
"While the above resolutions are in stronger language than our statute upon
the same subject, yet they are protests against the same evil, breathe the same
spirit and tend in the same direction.
"It is the fixed purpose of this court to carry out the spirit of this statute;
and, when a defendant has been properly charged with an offense and fairly
tried and the evidence clearly establishes his guilt, this court will not reverse
the conviction upon any technicality or exception which did not deprive the
defendant of a substantial right. We cannot perform this duty without examining the entire record and going over the entire case.
"It is true that in the first instance the jury constitute the triers of the case,
but when a defendant, by appeal, brings a case to this court and thereby
invokes our judgment, we cannot act intelligently upon his appeal and determine the application of the legal principle involved to the facts in the case unless
we carefully consider the evidence, and weigh it just as an intelligent jury
should do upon the trial. If we cannot do this, then this court is a miserable
and contemptible farce.
"The enforcement of the doctrine of harmless error in Oklahoma will greatly
improve the character of our criminal trials. Lawyers will be compelled to try
their cases upon their actual merits and will cease devoting so much time in
attempting to force technical errors into the record. The needless waste of
much valuable time and the expenditure of a great deal of money will be
saved and far better results will be reached in the administration of justice,
and the courts will gain the confidence and respect of the people, and acts of mob
violence will cease to disgrace our state. The reversal of the just convictions
of the guilty upon purely technical questions is the prime cause of want of confidence in the courts. This want of confidence often results in mob violence
on the part of a long-suffering and outraged public.
"We realize that a great responsibility rests upon this court and that we
have a sworn duty to perform, and we feel that it would be a crime against
society to reverse this conviction in the light of the entire record in this case.
If we thought that the alleged expert evidence in this case could have had any
influence upon the jury in convicting the defendant, we would seriously consider
the question of granting a new trial. But we could not entertain any such opinion without reflecting upon the intelligence or integrity of the jury. There is
nothing in this record which suggests a doubt upon this question. In the face
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of the entire record we have failed to find any error which would justify us in
setting aside the verdict and the judgment of the court recorded thereon.
"Having arrived at this conclusion after a most painstaking reinvestigation
of the entire record, our duty is plain. This court is largely responsible for the
property, the liberty and the lives of the people of the state of Oklahoma. Next
to honor, human'life is the most sacred thing on earth. He who needlessly takes
it must be held to a strict responsibility for such action. Laws are made to be
enforced. Punishments are prescribed to be inflicted. If men do not respect
the law, they must at least be made to fear it and to know that, while justice
may Move with a leaden tread, it crushes with an iron heel."
J. W. G.
Defects in Indictments.-In People v. Brander, Ill. 91 N. E. 59
(February 16, I9IO), an indictment charged the defendant, as agent of the
"American Express Company, an association," with embezzlement and larceny of
certain property of said company. The jury found the plaintiff guilty of larceny
of property worth $996. "The only question presented is whether the averment
of ownership by 'American Express Company, an association,' without alleging
incorporation or such facts as would show that said company could own property by that name, is sufficient." And because "'association' is a word of vague
meaning," and the indictment was "wholly lacking in any averment of ownership in any person, corporation or other entity that may be the owner of property," the judgment of the Criminal Court was reversed. The odd thing (it
may be remarked) is that in another opinion handed down on the same day
(Malleable Iron Range Co. v. Pusey, Ill. 91 N. E. 51) it is held with ease, following prior civil cases in Illinois, that "the transposition, alteration or omission
of some words in the name of a corporation consisting of several words is
immaterial [in a deed, devise or contract] if it was evident that corporation was
intended." So that, at the outset, there is in civil cases no obstacle to doing
justice if the person or body intended is clear from the description.
But in criminal cases, see what manner of law this is. Take an example:
A man catches a burglar in his house, collars him, goes to the telephone to call
the police station and this dialogue ensues: Householder-"Sergeant,I have a
burglar here; send the wagon to fetch him." Sergeant-"What name and number?" Householder-"George Wideawake, 214 Division street."
Sergeant"All fight; we'll come." Burglar (struggling to the telephone)-"Hold on,
Sergeant. He has given you the wrong number; it is 1616 Division street, by
the new legal numbering that went into effect in Chicago on May i, 191o.
I haven't burglarized any 214 Division street, and he has no right to aver that
I have." Sergeant (to householder)-"Is that so about the number?" Householder---"Yes, it is; I ought to have given you the legal number. But that
doesn't matter; I've got him here, and you know who I am and he knows
where he is, and he has burglarized this house, no matter what the number is." Sergeant--"O yes, it does matter. We can't come to No. 214 if
that isn't your number." Householder--"But, anyhow, I tell, you now that it is
No. 1616; so come along." Sergeant--"Nope; it's too late. You can't amend.
You ought to have told me the right number in the first place." (Sergeant hangs
up the telephone, countermands the wagon; burglar politely leaves by the front
door.)
That would be a pretty enough farce, of course. But what is the difference
between that case and this? None, in substance. Here is the state of Illinois
782
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with a thief caught; it proceeds to defend itself by getting the help of the law;
it calls upon the officers of the law to do their part, but in so calling it terms
the owner of the stolen property an "association." And because "association" is
a "vague term" the whole operation of the pursuit and jailing of a public
offender is stopped, and the case resolves itself into an academic discussion of
the correct description of the victimized party, although there is no question of
the offender's guilt, and although no man, woman or child from Waukegan to
Cairo has the slightest doubt who the "American Express Company" is or
whether it could own or did own this stolen property.
We do not say that such a miscarriage of justice is due to the statutes, to
the common law, to the courts or to the lawyers, or to all together. We do say
that it is the strangest thing in the world to call by the name of Justice. In this
day and generation a community which fondly attempts to protect itself against
crime by such methods is like a child playing with its toy soldiers.-J. H. W. (in
the Illinois Law Review).
Perversion of Justice in the Heinze Case.-Ulzited States v. Heinze, 177
Fed. 77o, is a conspicuous example of the sacrifice of justice to verbal logic. It
was a criminal action against F. Augustus Heinze for misapplication of funds
of a national bank in New York City. The prosecution involved the examination
of voluminous books of account, which were not only intricate, but were clouded
by false and misleading entries. The United States attorney required in the
performance of his duty the assistance of an expert accountant, and at his request
the attorney-general appointed such a person, and expressly authorized him to
aid in presenting the case to the grand jury. This expert went with the United
States attorney before the grand jury and assisted him in unraveling the complicated accounts and unfolding their true meaning through the examination of
witnesses. The investigation resulted in an indictment against Heinze. Thereupon a motion was made to quash the indictment because the expert accountant
had been permitted to assist the United States attorney before the grand jury.
The motion was granted and the indictment quashed.
What is the result of this kind of administration of criminal law? Does it
protect the innocent against the abuse of governmental power? Certainly not.
It is expressly stated in the opinion that the aid of the expert was necessary to
an intelligent presentation of the case, and that his conduct was free from criticism. The result of the decision, therefore, is simply to deny to the agents of
the government in the administration of criminal law necessary assistance, such
assistance as the very nature of the case required. Here is the reasoning of the
court: In early times no one was admitted to the grand jury room except
the prosecuting officer, therefore this practice can never be changed except by
statute. This limits the administration of justice to such conveniences as were
adequate when causes before grand juries involved the. simple issues of common
law crimes. At the present time courts have to deal with the intricate accounts
of modern corporate finance. These are matters that have recently arisen.
Cannot the administration of criminal law take account of such changed circumstances? The practice of grand juries is not the creation of statute, but
rests wholly in the decisions of courts. If they are not to abdicate their power
to accommodate their law to changed conditions, there is no reason why the
great change introduced into our life by corporate organizations should not be
taken account of. There was a time when even prosecuting officers were not
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admitted to the grand jury room, but the practice was changed by the courts
in furtherance of an efficient administration of criminal law. A little later
stenography came into use, and for some years the question was learnedly
debated whether an indictment was invalidated by the fact that a stenographer
was present to keep a record of the testimony before the grand jury. Finally,
however, the courts reached the conclusion that these ordinary clerical conveniences did not poison proceedings before the grand jury. Can any sound
reason be assigned why the aid of an expert accountant in the examination of
the intricate books of account of a modern corporation should not receive a
similar treatment by the courts? The grand jury is an indispensable part of
every criminal prosecution in the Federal courts. Is it wise for those courts, in
order to save the jury from imaginary and fanciful prejudice, to deny to them
indispensable aid for the intelligent performance of their duty? Here the
accountant was a sworn officer of the Government. He simply assisted the
United States Attorney in unraveling and explaining the books of account to
the grand jury. Can anyone suggest wherein his conduct would be any more
likely to prejudice them than would the same conduct by the prosecuting officer?
Crimes of corporate mismanagement constitute today one of the most serious
menaces of society. The government in prosecuting them has to rely largely
upon the books and bookkeepers of the men whose conduct is under investigation. These accountants, as a rule, are hostile witnesses. It is possible for them
to give such an explanation of dishonest accounts as to completely mislead a
grand jury. Unless an expert is at hand to aid the United States attorney in
conducting the examination so as to set the matter right at once, the jury is
confused and the prosecution must frequently fail. Expert accountants are
recognized as indispensable aids in presenting such causes to a petit jury. Grand
juries are composed of the same class of laymen, and are just as much in need
of the same kind of aid. What folly is it to create a tribunal to investigate
crime, and then, out of fanciful fear or prejudice, deny to it the means essential to the intelligent performance of its duty? Could the big corporate criminal
ask for any better protection than such refined scholasticism? It is the defeat
of substantial justice in such cases as the one here under review which makes
our administration of law a byword and a hissing in the judgment of all men
outside of the legal profession.
The decision under consideration shows how impossible it is for the Legislature to secure an efficient administration of law if the courts are guided by
mere verbal refinements. As far back as 1861, the Attorney-General was authorized to appoint special assistants to district attorneys to aid them in the performance of "their duties."
One would say, upon a mere reading of the
language, that the statute covered all the duties of a district attorney, including the presentation of cases before the grand jury. But the United States Court
for the Southern District of New York, in United States v. Rosenthal, 121 Fed.
862, by what was characterized in U. S. v. Cobban, 127 Fed. 717, as "a deft
and subtle process of reasoning," held that this language should be confined to
the trial of cases in court, and did not authorize the appearance of special attorneys before a grand jury, and for that reason set aside an indictment. To cure
this decision, CongreSs by the Act of June 3o, i9o6, provided "that the AttorneyGeneral or any officer of the Department of Justice or any attorney or counselor,
specially appointed by the Attorney-General, under any provision of law, may,
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when thereunto specifically directed by the Attorney-General, conduct any kind
of legal proceeding, civil or criminal, including grand jury proceedings, * * *
which district attorneys now are, or hereafter may be, by law authorized to
conduct." This statute was sufficient to cure the defect as to special assistant
attorneys, but would not extend to a special accountant, because, forsooth, he is
not "an officer of the Department of Justice." The result is that Congress must
try again in order to get a net fine enough to catch the refinements of the judicial
mind.
It is greatly to be hoped that a writ of error will be sued out to review the
Heinze case, so that it may not stand as a precedent to embarrass the practical
administration of law.'
'Since the above was written, the Supreme Court has rendered a decision,
December 5, to the effect that the Circuit Court erred in holding the indictment
insufficient.

